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Abstract
This paper reports the results of applying lifetime (or reliability database) statistical analysis methods
to engine removal data recorded over the initial 8 years’ service of the General Electric F414-GE-400
turbofan engines propelling the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet in service with the USNavy, with the intent
of better understanding the reasons for engine removal and their impact on engine time on wing
(TOW), and to gain an insight into the reliability of the modules and components from which the
engine is assembled. It was found that ‘‘coloring’’ the engine removals into three classes of reasons for
removal enabled lifetime data analysis revealing interesting and useful features of in-service engine
reliability. Nonparametric statistical analysis provided actionable information on engine removal
probability as a function of TOW and removal cause that should be applicable to planning flight
operations, line maintenance, and support logistics. The analysis of engine removals due to hot sec-
tion distress appears to disconfirm the presumption of independence between the three classes of
removal. Opportunistic maintenance of modules made accessible due to engine removals to service
other modules may significantly affect the observed engine removal distribution of the module of
interest, i.e., competing risk masks the underlying module hazard functions.
Introduction
The General Electric Aviation (GE) F414-GE-
400 engine is the low-bypass gas turbine pro-
pulsion system installed in the F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet (manufactured by the Boeing Company),
a twin engine all-weather strike aircraft that en-
tered service with the US Navy in 1999.
Deliveries of F414-powered F/A-18E/F Super
Hornets from Boeing continue to this day, and so
the engines in service span a wide range of cal-
endar lives and total flight times. Some have
never been removed from the aircraft they were
delivered with; others have been removed for
maintenance and reinstalled in (other) aircraft
up to nine times.
The F/A-18E/F aircraft is typically carrier based
for operations and, as a consequence, the
maintenance philosophy and process applied to
all subsystems is tailored to the demanding
shipboard environment, with its restricted space,
limited manpower, and challenging logistics.
The F414-GE-400 is maintained using a military
maintenance process with three organizational
levels: the O-Level (operational), I-Level (inter-
mediate), and D-Level (depot). This
maintenance structure is well suited to the
shipboard operational context, and the design
and the configuration of the F414 is modular
(Figure 1) to allow engine refurbishing and
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rebuilding by changing out only the module(s)
affected by the reason why the engine was re-
moved from the aircraft at the O-Level (base or
shipboard). The fan section, high-pressure com-
pressor, combustor, high-pressure turbine, low-
pressure turbine, and afterburner are separately
tracked as modules that can be independently
removed at the I-Level for depot maintenance.
(The F414 is a two-shaft engine; the low-pres-
sure turbine drives the fan while the high-
pressure turbine independently drives the high-
pressure compressor.)
Maintenance activity at the O-Level is limited
to regular external inspections and servicing,
troubleshooting flight crew ‘‘squawks,’’ fault
indications and functional failures, periodic in-
spection for internal distress or other inspections
intended to preempt specific component failure
modes, replacement of an externally accessible
weapons replaceable article (WRA), and
removal of the complete F414 engine unit. (The
periodic inspection occurs at a preventive main-
tenance interval of about 0.6 engine flight hour
[EFH] index—the usage parameter used as a
measure of lifetime in the following analysis.)
Engine removals may be ‘‘scheduled’’ for
planned preventive maintenance, including
mandatory replacement ‘‘life-limited’’ compo-
nents and inspections of high time components,
or ‘‘unscheduled’’ due to unanticipated failure or
unacceptable performance degradation. A large
proportion of unscheduled removals are the
result of deficiencies discovered during the peri-
odic O-Level inspection for internal distress.
The engines removed are shipped to a shore-
based I-Level facility for detailed inspection and
assessment to isolate the failure and secondary
damage to one or more engine modules. If the
affected engine modules cannot be made ser-
viceable at the I-Level, the engine is broken
down and the affected modules are shipped to
the F414 depot for repair. The engine is then re-
built by drawing on the available pool of
available spare modules, taking into consider-
ation the remaining scheduled useful life of the
modules (and their component parts) to accom-
modate a target time on wing (TOW) before the
next scheduled removal. Schoch (2003) provides
a more detailed description of the maintenance
process for the F414-GE-400.
Early in the work reported here, it was decided
to focus on the O-Level maintenance process
for the F414 engine and specifically on engine
removals as the most costly, operationally
disruptive, and logistically challenging events
recorded. The primary intent of the analysis is to
understand the determinants and characteristics
of F414 engine removals to enable improved
operational, maintenance, and logistics
planning.
It was hoped that the above F414 maintenance
process would also allow an insight into module
and component reliability as a function of usage
(TOW). A fundamental assumption was that
there were no significant deviations from the
modular maintenance process described above,
i.e., modules were only subject to refurbishment
or replacement if implicated in the reason for
removal cited in the maintenance records.
The data source for this analysis is one of the
most advanced reliability databases (RDB) used
in support of naval aviation weapon systems.
This RDB, designated by General Electric as
their ‘‘Military Data Warehouse’’ (MDW),
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F414-GE-400. GE compiles and maintains the
F414 MDWusing data available from US Navy
sources, with event scoring and supplemental
entries by GE technical support personnel.
A primary function of the MDW RDB is to pro-
vide an overview of F414 safety, reliability, and
readiness, predominantly trends for the total
fleet versus calendar time. These calendar-based
trends necessarily track a changing aircraft pop-
ulation, because deliveries of new F/A-18 E/F
aircraft have been continuous and unabated
since its introduction in 1999. (The evolving age
distribution of the fleet may influence the ob-
served removal rates if the failure distributions
significantly differ from exponential distribu-
tions, i.e., constant hazard rates.)
The critical high-level metrics currently moni-
tored to assess fleetwide engine health and
reliability are unscheduled engine removal
(UER) rates, engine TOW, ground and flight
abort rates, and in-flight shutdown rates (IFSD).
These are calculated monthly as fleet averages,
tracked versus cause and reason for removal,
and absolute levels and trends are monitored
versus calendar time.
The MDWalso supports tracking of life-limited
components, components that must be replaced
at a predetermined usage level based on EFHs,
operating cycles, other life usage indicators , and
combinations of more than one usage parameter.
Such ‘‘hard-time’’ component removals usually
result in a scheduled O-Level removal of the
engine and its return to an I-Level station
for removal and replacement of the module
containing the time-expired component,
which is then delivered to the F414 depot for
teardown, component replacement, rebuilding,
and test.
The third use of the MDW, identifying, assess-
ing, and mitigating emerging safety and
readiness issues, is less visible as it typically re-
quires customized analysis of the available
MDW data. Leading reliability degraders are
identified by Pareto analysis, and the reliability
of specific components may be assessed using
parametric models for lifetime data, typically
Weibull distributions.
The MDW contains extensive records of main-
tenance activity and reliability at the module,
WRA, and serialized component level, but these
were not investigated in the analysis reported
here, which was limited in scope to the O-Level
removals.
The work reported here applied statistical meth-
ods for lifetime data analysis, also known as
RDB analysis, to UER at O-Level, to better un-
derstand the evolution and outcomes of the total
process of managing the reliability of propulsion
systems in Naval aviation service. It was under-
stood that this investigation would provide only
indirect information on the underlying (latent)
module removal probabilities.
For example, scheduled engine removals (SER)
are an ‘‘independent’’ variable, in the sense that
they are preventive maintenance that is part of
the maintenance and configuration management
process. SER that affect the reliability of the
affected module (their intended purpose in most
cases) will mask the latent module removal
probabilities, i.e., SER are a likely source of
competing risk. (See Lawless 2003 for a recent
treatment of the difficulties introduced by com-
peting risks.)
This is a radical departure from the roots of life-
time data analysis in medical and materials
research. In-service aircraft engines are not a
random sample of nominally identical items
treated to carefully defined and controlled pro-
tocols. Over the 8 years of records extracted
from the GE F414 RDB, engine configuration,
and maintenance procedures were actively mod-
ified in response to the observed reliability of the
engines.
Operational aircraft availability and costs are
strongly influenced by engine reliability, and so
any shortcomings from expected and tolerable
reliability levels were, and are, subject to
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aggressive mitigation to restore fleet capabilities.
Furthermore, high time engines (and modules)
removed for scheduled or unscheduled mainte-
nance are proactively inspected for signs of
distress or incipient failure. Significant findings
are likely to result in corrective action.
Thus, in many ways, the MDW lifetime data
analysis presented here has more affinity with
actuarial or epidemiological studies, where
evolving differences in the population studied
and relevant interventions are crucially impor-
tant in analyzing and understanding the lifetime
data. However, more so than in either of these
fields, the purpose of this study is to provide
tools to improve the timeliness and effectiveness
of ‘‘closed-loop’’ control of the outcomes, in this
case effective propulsion system reliability in the
field in the context of an intensive preventive
maintenance process. It was hoped that this
analysis would yield qualitative insights into
module reliability, particularly its evolution with
changing engine configuration and other inter-
ventions.
Analysis of F414EngineRemovals
Note: In all that follows, the F414-GE-400 EFHs
reported by the GE MDWwere scaled by a con-
stant, to protect proprietary and controlled
information on F/A-18E/F operations and F414
availability. Thus, accumulated operational life in
EFH and time since new (TSN) and time since
removal (TSR) data are all presented as EFH In-
dices, TSN Indices, and TSR Indices, denominated
by a more or less arbitrary EFH figure. (TSN is a
basic metric for removals—the accumulated EFH
count since the engine was first installed in an air-
craft. TSR is the accumulated EFH since the latest
prior removal of the engine.)
October 2006 was taken as a baseline for this
analysis, and full records of all engine removals
from entry into service to this date were
acquired. This file records 1,174 engine removal
events from May 1999 to October 2006. Each
event record included 68 entries, including dates,
locations and organizations, aircraft and engine
position, engine, module and part serial numbers
and identity, control numbers, symptoms and
reason for removal, field and shop findings and
remarks, maintenance labor hours and duration,
links to maintenance documentation, a variety
of codes—unplanned versus planned removals,
flight and ground abort, IFSD, etc.—and time
(in EFH) since new (TSN), and since the
previous removal (TSR).
For the purposes of this research, this engine
removals database was extensively edited to
remove sensitive information and detail that
impeded analysis. Only records from F/A-18 E/F
operational service (exclusive of developmental
flight test) were retained, as exemplified by the
extract shown in Table 1. This consists of a
reduced data set for each removal: an identifier
unique to each engine derived from the sequential
production serial numbers, a reason for removal
code for unscheduled removals (defined below),
counters for scheduled removals versus unsched-
uled removals and ground and flight aborts, and
IFSD, and TSR and TSN indices.
The many SER (indicated by SER Count5 1 in
Table 1) presented a quandary; although UER
were clearly most relevant to the task at hand,
SER are intended to preempt UER, affecting the
operational outcomes, and may thus represent a
competing risk for UER. Also, an SER will
‘‘censor’’ the removal data for any reason for
removal code where the associated configuration
changes modify the probability of future removals
for that code, possibly ‘‘renewing’’ the engine for
that code. In the analysis presented here this pos-
sibility was effectively neglected. Furthermore, the
SER requirements are dynamic; they are deliber-
ately modified over time in response to observed
engine reliability. Nevertheless, it was pragmati-
cally decided to ignore SER for the following
analysis and return to these issues in light of the
findings on UER. Further study is planned in
future work that will access detailed data from
I-Level and depot maintenance records in the
GEMDWRDB, which will hopefully allow a
better accounting of censoring and competing risk
impacts of SER at the component and module
level.
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The results presented here are an indicator of the
combined effects of inherent component reli-
ability, changes to maintenance procedures
(such as SER intervals and requirements), and
evolution of the engines’ configuration over the
period covered by this study on the engine
removal rates for specific reasons. A rationale
for this approach is that the objective of this
research was not to measure the underlying
‘‘latent’’ reliability of the modules and compo-
nents; the purpose is to demonstrate improved
indicators of the effectiveness of the overall en-
gine life management process.
The F414 MDW RDB included identification of
the module charged with the removal at the O-
Level, plus extensive findings at the I-Level, and
the depot—plus comments from the GE service
engineers. After considerable study, this infor-
mation was summarized as eight reasons for
removal codes defined specifically for this study,
as shown in Table 2. These combine distinct
competing failure and degradation modes within
the module (or class of failure) affected, while
attempting to segregate modes driven by
differing root causes—usage versus external
events versus maintenance induced.
In most cases, the above categories follow the
basic engine module breakdown fan, compres-
sor, combustor, high-pressure turbine, low-
pressure turbine, and afterburner, with Code 5
for oil and fuel leaks and externals, including the
accessory gearbox and fuel system, oil system,
and control system components.
In the case of the compressor, it was necessary to
distinguish between intrinsic component failures
(Code 7) and those with external causes—
specifically damage due to foreign object
ingestion damage (FOD)—which was assigned
to Code 1.
There were no indications of internal compressor
failures driving engines ‘‘off wing’’ prematurely.
Code 7 removals were not associated with com-
pressor turbo-machinery; they were predominantly
due to failures in the external linkages and levers
controlling compressor variable geometry.
The reason for removal Code 0 cuts across all
modules and was assigned when removal was
seen to be due to maintenance error or other
mishaps, including cases where no cause could
be identified or the reported cause could not be
confirmed at the I-Level. Here it was also de-
cided to include the small number of removals
for miscellaneous reasons that did not fit the in-
tent of other codes.
These codes were defined to suit the intent to iso-
late subsets of the removals with distinctive failure
TABLE 1: Structure of edited engine removals Database
Engine
Identifier
R for R Count

15 FOD,


















1 0 1 0 0 0 0.7237 0.81
1 5 1 0 1 0 0 0.1532 0.96
1 3 1 0 0 1 0 0.4565 1.42
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.0180 1.44
1 0 1 0 0 0 0.9009 2.34
1 0 1 0 0 0 1.7778 4.12
2 0 1 0 0 0 0.7568 0.76
2 0 1 0 0 0 0.0931 0.85
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.4324 1.28
2 0 1 0 0 0 0.6276 1.91
2 4 1 0 0 0 0 1.5586 3.47
2 5 1 0 0 0 0 1.6577 5.16
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distributions driven by differing usage and expo-
sure factors. For example, turbine and combustor
module degradation and failures are driven by
thermomechanical stresses (cycling from low to
high power and speed) and material creep and
degradation (time at high power and speed). To a
first-order approximation, these factors should be
related to component and engine service time and
flight cycles. FOD and maintenance error might
be expected to be more random, i.e., a constant
hazard throughout the engine’s service life.
Of the 665 recorded unscheduled removals, as
detailed in Figure 2, most were accounted for by
four primary and distinct causes, and Codes 2, 3,
and 4 were all related to the thermomechanically
stressed engine hot section. Code 6 could be
eliminated at little cost, as the afterburner is
quite distinct from the basic engine. As analysis
proceeded, it became evident that the reasons for
removal 0, 5, and 7 might be combined for
economy of analysis, due to similarities in the
statistical characteristics of the data and the
common factor of being external to the core en-
gine and vulnerable to maintenance and other
exogenous effects.
The resulting three classes of UER (FOD, core
engine distress, and residual, external, reasons)
were then subjected to a lifetime statistical anal-
ysis, to provide a distinct and hopefully
informative view of engine reliability between
fleet-wide averages and rates and detailed mod-
ule and component RDB analysis. Before
moving on to the method developed to do this,
there are issues to be addressed.
CompetingRisks andCensoring
Given the complexity of a gas turbine engine and
the maintenance process, competing risk needs
to be considered. Within a given reason for re-
moval code, different failure modes compete to
drive a removal, but again this is only salient if
we are attempting to understand and model the
failure modes to predict module reliability. Be-
cause the scope of this analysis did not address
the root cause of the removal, beyond confirma-
tion of the reason for removal code from the
information in the engine removal record, there
was no consideration of competing risk at this
level of granularity.
In ongoing and planned future work on GE
MDW I-Level and depot maintenance data ad-
dressing module and component reliability, it
should be possible to narrow the scope of com-
peting risk to the serialized component level,
and possibly within a component if parts re-
placements are recorded. Interesting issues will
arise, such as the qualitative difference between
a component failure and a removal of the same
part number due to inspection at I-Level or
depot, which might require estimating the
failure time of the latter, or treating these as
separate events and comparing the hazard
functions. However, the ambiguities at the
module and engine removal level should be
minimized.
More salient to this research, it is a known fact
that when the engine is at the I-Level to remove
and replace one module, it may be decided to
remove and replace another as preventive main-
tenance, a competing risk in the context of the
reliability of the affected module. This could be
due to shop inspection picking up a problem not
noted at the O-Level, secondary damage, or the
module might have scheduled maintenance due
within the prescribed engine ‘‘build window’’ for
delivery back to the fleet.
These opportunistic module removals, which
should be considered as censoring, are not evi-
dent in the engine removals data studied here but
may have a significant effect on the validity of
TABLE 2: Reason for Removal Codes
Used for Analysis
Code 0 Mishaps and maintenance errors
Code 1 Foreign object damage (FOD)
Code 2 Combustor
Code 3 High-pressure turbine
Code 4 Low-pressure turbine
Code 5 Externals and subsystems
(e.g., control, fuel, and lubrication systems)
Code 6 Afterburner
Code 7 Fan and compressor mechanical (intrinsic)
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the results, similar to SER that affect subsequent
engine removal probabilities. The F414 MDW
does provide this information in module-level
reports and engine configuration records, and
this will be accounted for in planned analyses
of module and component reliability. However,
as noted above for SER, and if our concern is
characterizing engine removals, these effects
are part of the total maintenance and configura-
tion management process resulting in the engine
removal outcomes we are attempting to assess.
Future work is planned to explain and model
engine removals by extracting latent module and
component reliability and building a model of
overall reliability encompassing engine rem-
ovals. This is beyond the scope of the research
reported here. At this level, lifetime statistical
methods accounting for censoring must be
considered to counter the distortion of apparent
engine reliability and calendar-based trends by
the nonuniform ages of the engine population.
However, the engine removals data also require
consideration of censoring. In looking into the
data, it is evident that many engines were not
removed during the time period covered, or were
removed but not for the specific reasons for re-
moval being considered in analyzing the data for
a specific removals code. This negative evidence
needs to be considered in arriving at a valid pic-
ture of engine reliability. See Lawless (2003)
for an accessible treatment of the concept of
censoring and the methods used here.
Since the removals data covered the period from
initial F/A-18E/F fleet service up to October
2006, further analysis requires at least the EFHs
since new (TSN) of all engines currently installed
in aircraft or held as spares at the beginning of
that month. These data were provided by a
standard MDW report and are summarized as a
histogram in Figure 3.
The total population of active engines was 620.
The TSN Index distribution in Figure 3 is a con-
sequence of the operational tempo over the
8-year service period studied, but the shape is
dominated by the effect of continued engine
deliveries in new aircraft and spares provisioning
throughout the period, which continues to the
present. This is most evident in the plot of the
inverse of the cumulative percent count; the
roughly linear decline reflects a continuous
addition of new engines to the population.
Figure 4 shows a different presentation of the
same information; here, the bar chart
illustrates the population of engines within
or exceeding the given TSN Index interval
as of the end of October 2006. (The
percentage decrement is the proportion of
engines at that TSN Index level.) Clearly, our
interpretation of engine removal lifetime data
needs to reflect the difference in the number
of engines that have achieved a specific TSN
Index level.
Nonparametric StatisticalAnalysis of F414
EngineRemovals
Parametric statistical methods exist that account
for censoring, but exploration of the data using
nonparametric methods is necessary to deter-
mine whether and what parametric tools might
be appropriate. Lawless (2003) provides a re-
cent, accessible, and comprehensive treatment of
nonparametric statistical methods for lifetime
data and these were applied to the data for the
three classes of reasons for removal.
The most useful for visualizing and understand-
ing the F414 UER data were found to be the life
table approach. The first challenge in applying
this method was to decide the most appropriate
lifetime measure. Generally, neither the TSR
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Index nor the TSN Index was suitable; what was
appropriate was the TSN Index of the first re-
moval in a given class and the TSN Index
difference between each successive pair of rem-
ovals in the same class.
If a particular engine had not experienced a re-
moval in the class being considered, its total
accumulated EFH Index to the end of October
2006 would represent a right-censored data
point, a ‘‘suspension’’ in Weibull parametric
analysis terms. Similarly, for engines that had ex-
perienced a removal in the class being considered,
the difference between the TSN Index of the last
removal and its total EFH Index at the end of
October should be added to the censored data set.





















































Figure 3: Distribution of the Accumulated
EFH Index for the Total F414 Fleet








































# Engines Achieving TSN Index % Decrement
Figure 4: Engine Count Surviving to a
Given TSN Index Level
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Preparing the data thus required an inspection of
the removals plus accumulated EFH Index his-
tory for each engine; Table 3 provides a typical
example of an individual engine TSN Index
history.
This example would contribute two data points
for FOD (Code 1) one UER @ 1.495 (this engine
suffered FOD before accumulating any flight
time after the Code 5 removal and reinstallation)
and a subsequent right-censored run of
(2.345–1.495)5 0.85 EFH Index up to the
end of October 2006.
For the class of Codes 0, 5, and 7, this engine
contributes two removals (in this case, with
differing codes, the full TSN Indices of 1.495
and 1.859) and the differences of 0.486
(2.345 1.859) and 0.85 to the final installed
EFH Index. The last line contributes a right-cen-
sored data point at EFH Index 2.345 to all
analyses, including the core engine distress
(Codes 2, 3, and 4) data set.
Figure 5 illustrates the life table result for FOD
using intervals of 0.25 EFH Index, estimates of
the hazard rate [h(t)] calculated as the number of
removals divided by the population subject to
removal, and an approximation to the survivor
function [S(t)] obtained incrementally from the
hazard rate estimate, i.e., Sj = Sj 1  Sj (hj) 
Sj1  Sj1 (hj) (1hj) = Sj1 (1hj1hj2).
Standard deviation (69%) confidence bounds
are shown for both the hazard rate and the sur-
vivor function. These increase as the engine
population achieving higher lifetimes declines.
Two points are notable, the roughly constant
hazard rate (averaging 30% per EFH Index)
after TSN Index 2.0—not unexpected for what
is expected to be a constant risk for each takeoff
and landing with some average level of mission
flight hours. Because FOD is usually detected
during preventive maintenance at the 0.6 EFH
Index inspections, the 30% hazard rate implies
an 18% (41 in 5) chance of an FOD removal at
every inspection of an engine after the first in-
spection.
The other is that the survivor function is still
about 40% at the last removal, i.e.,41/3 of all
engines can be expected to achieve a TSN Index
of 6.0 without experiencing FOD. Clearly, these
results provide useful guidance for maintenance
and logistics planning.
Figure 6 shows the result of the same method ap-
plied to the removals for various external causes,
including maintenance-induced problems and
mishaps, i.e., for Codes 0, 5, and 7. Ignoring the
two data points beyond TSN Index 6.0, the
removals hazard rate displays behavior similar
to that for FOD, a rapid increase above 20% and
relatively constant thereafter. Again, the exoge-
nous causes for many of the failures make this
appear reasonable.
Figure 7 investigates the result of the active mit-
igation efforts expected for this class of
removals. While FOD is difficult to counter, the
detailed causes affecting this category can be
readily addressed through training, changes to
maintenance procedures, and relatively rapid
configuration upgrades. Many of the configura-
tion changes were introduced over time by
scheduled removals or incidental to unscheduled
removals for all causes. After Engine 247, a
block upgrade incorporated the bulk of these
changes, and so this cohort alone was given the
same treatment. The difference is startling.
The measures adopted were effective in reducing
the hazard rate for external causes to below 5%
in all but one interval.
Figure 8, for Codes 2–4, presents the results for
core engine distress. In this case the hazard rate
TABLE 3: Typical Engine Removals
History




UER – Code 5 1.495
UER – Code 1 1.495
UER – Code 7 1.859
Installed 11/2006 2.345
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increases slowly through TSN Index 3, and holds
at about 20% thereafter, implying a one in eight
chance of an engine removal for core engine dis-
tress at every inspection after the fifth one.
However, the survivor function estimate
suggests that 50% of all engines will achieve a
TSN Index of 6 without a removal for core
engine distress.
However, the confidence bounds and the paucity
of data make it hard to extrapolate with any de-
gree of confidence beyond TSN Index 6. As a
scheduled overhaul is performed about this time,
this is not a matter of much practical concern.
Other well-established nonparametric tools, de-
scribed in Lawless (2003) and other sources,
were applied to the Code 2–4 removals to illus-
trate the changes in engine reliability before and
after the block change in configuration at engine
#248 and to analyze competition between
preventive maintenance—engines removed
as a result of inspections—and failures—engines
removed because of mission aborts and IFSD.
The methods used, the Kaplan–Meier Product
Limit estimator for the survivor function and the
Nelson–Aalen estimator for the cumulative
hazard function, and the results are presented in
detail in Millar (2007) and Millar et al. (2007).

























TSN  Index (or difference for successive removals)
Hazard Rate Survivor Function
Figure 5: Estimated Hazard Rate and
Survivor Function – Code 1 Removals






























TSN Index (or difference for successive removals)
Hazard Rate survivor function
160
Figure 6: Estimated Hazard Rate and
Survivor Function – Codes 0, 5, and 7
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Conclusions
The statistical lifetime analysis approach used
here adds a crucial and complementary element
to the other tools used to monitor engine
removals frequency and the reasons for
removal—the influence of individual engine
TOWon engine removals. Nonparametric
statistical lifetime analysis methods applied to
this large and complex RDB were surprisingly
effective in providing an insight into engine
reliability as measured by engine removals at
the flight line.
The approach applied provided actionable in-
formation on the probability of an O-Level
inspection resulting in an engine removal for a
given class of reasons for removal. The net result
was to show the effectiveness of the overall pro-
pulsion system maintenance process (including
engine configuration updates) in dynamically
managing engine removals to operationally tol-
erable levels.
Novel treatments of the data to aggregate a
tractable number of reasons for removal causes
and then generate appropriate lifetime measures
appear to have worked well despite heroic as-
sumptions. In particular, the decisions to avoid
the complexity of incorporating data on
scheduled removals and the competing risk of

































hazard rate / index Interval survivor function
Figure 8: Estimated Hazard Rate and
Survivor Function – Code 2–4 Removals




















Hazard Rate survivor function
Figure 7: Estimated Hazard Rate and
Survivor Function – Codes 0, 5, and 7 for
Engine Numbers 247 and Up.
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opportunistic module replacements at the
I-Level appear to be justified.
It is hard to conceive that a parametric analysis
could add significant actionable information
beyond what can be gleaned from these nonpara-
metric procedures—at this level of analysis. The
same methods should be of use when applied to
removals of WRA providing useful information
for maintenance management to address the
resultant maintenance workload burden and the
operational disruption of mission aborts.
However, a larger task lies ahead: the application
of these methods and advanced parametric mod-
els for competing risks to the analysis of F414
MDWrecords of modular removals at the I-Level
and component removals and replacements at the
depot. This in-depth analysis promises the possi-
bility of comprehensive modeling of F414 engine
reliability from the bottom up.
FutureWork
Two Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
projects have been awarded to develop ad-
vanced-automated techniques to mine and
analyze the GE MDW RDB in greater depth
than was attempted in the research reported
here. These efforts include access to I–Level
module removal and depot maintenance data.
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